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DIGITAL CLUSTER MARKETS
Herbert Hovenkamp*
One foundational requirement of markets in antitrust cases
is that they consist of products that are close substitutes for one
another. Even though markets are nearly always porous, this
principle is very robust in antitrust analysis and there are few
deviations. The principle is also important for ensuring that
changes in substantive antitrust law are not made through the
back door as a result of overly broad or narrow market
definitions.
This Article considers the role of “cluster” markets, or
markets for goods that are not close substitutes, in antitrust
litigation, the minimum requirements for recognizing such
markets, and the relevance of network effects in identifying
them. Clustering noncompeting products into a single market
for purposes of antitrust analysis can be valuable, provided
that its limitations are understood. Clustering contributes to
market power when (1) many customers prefer the convenience
of receiving the defendant’s grouping of products rather than
any single one, or (2) economies of joint provision (economies of
scope in production) make joint distribution of the cluster
cheaper per good than distribution of each separately, and (3)
entering into competition with the cluster is difficult.
When network effects are present, an important additional
reason is what might be termed economies of scope in
consumption, or increased value that accrues as a group of
goods or services offered on the same platform becomes not only
more numerous but also more diverse. Often the best way to
address the cluster market problem is to avoid market
definition altogether. Here, digital markets are particularly
susceptible to direct measurements of market power that do not
depend on a market definition. One limitation on their use,
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however, is that many of the methodologies require estimating
demand changes in response to price changes, but several
digital platforms engage with consumers at a price of zero.
Here, however, changes in product quality can operate as an
adequate (inverse) surrogate for changes in price.
Finally, the logic of cluster markets carries an implicit
warning about antitrust remedies. Clustering occurs when it
creates value, and for consumers as well as producers. As a
result, antitrust enforcers should be wary about aggressive
breakup remedies that serve to break apart components that
were clustered for the very reason that clustering is valuable.
I. Introduction ..................................................................... 247
II. Cluster Markets in Antitrust Cases .............................. 256
III. Network Effects and Cluster Markets ......................... 262
IV. Cluster Markets and Direct Proof of Power ................. 271
V. Conclusion, and a Warning About Remedies ................. 277

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the role of “cluster” markets in
antitrust litigation, the minimum requirements for
recognizing such markets, and the relevance of network
effects in identifying them. Finally, it considers alternative
ways of assessing power over clusters of noncompeting goods.
Many antitrust violations require proof of market power,
or the power profitably to reduce output and raise price above
cost.1 Historically, antitrust litigants and courts have
estimated power by determining a market share of a properly
defined “relevant market.”2 The concept of a “market” is
hardly limited to antitrust, however, and has been a feature

2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 501
(Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2021).
2 See id. ¶ 531.
1
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of partial equilibrium analysis in microeconomics at least
since the time of Alfred Marshall3 and, before that, Cournot.4
One foundational requirement of markets in antitrust
cases is that they consist of products that are roughly identical
or at least very close substitutes for one another. As a result,
products within a market compete with one another, while
products inside a market do not compete with products located
outside. Even though markets are nearly always porous, this
principle is very robust in antitrust analysis, with few
deviations.5 It is crucial because an erroneous market
definition can lead to disguised but unanalyzed changes in
substantive doctrine. For example, an overly narrow market
definition can result in an expansion of refusal to deal doctrine
into situations where the substantive law would not permit
it.6
To be sure, many markets consist of differentiated
products, particularly for manufactured goods as opposed to
commodities. Differentiation can give rise to difficult issues
about whether two products are sufficiently far apart from one
another in a product space that their competition is slight and
they thus should not be placed in the same market.7 For
example, are video cassette or DVD movies, theater-shown

ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 385–86 (8th ed. 1920).
AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 46, 50 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., New York,
MacMillan Co. 1897) (1838) (hypothesizing discrete markets for
undifferentiated commodities). On the relationship between partial
equilibrium analysis and antitrust’s relevant market, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Invention of Antitrust, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. (2022)
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995502 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
5 See Hovenkamp, supra note 4 (manuscript at 50–51).
6 See discussion infra, text at notes 58–60.
7 This was famously so in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400, 405 (1956) (grouping cellophane, wax paper, tin foil,
and common wrapping paper into a single market); United States v. Cont’l
Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 456–57 (1964) (grouping metal cans and glass bottles
into the same market). See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 539.
3
4
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movies, and digitally streamed movies all in the same market
simply because viewers switch among them?8
The “hypothetical monopolist” test (HMT), sometimes
called the “hypothetical cartel” test, approaches market
definition by examining the relationship between pricing and
substitution behavior.9 The test identifies markets by trying
to determine the smallest grouping of sales for which a
hypothetical monopolist would be able to charge a sustainable
monopoly price.10 For example, consider an alleged market for
coffee makers, which consists of four technologies: manual
drip devices, electric drip, French press, and Italian espresso
machines. All of them make coffee. Some people drink coffee
made by two or more of them, and some may even be
indifferent. Others may have strong preferences for one over
the other. On the supply side, these devices use different raw
materials and different technologies in their production.
Suppose that we observe from retail sales (scanner) data
that when the price of manual drip makers increased by 10%,
the sellers of those devices lost 4,000 sales. Three thousand of
those diverted sales went to French presses, 700 went to
electric drip machines, and 200 went to espresso machines.
The final 100 simply exited from the market. That indicates
that while all four devices compete to some degree, the
competition between the manual drip and French press
devices is much greater than that between manual drip
makers and other technologies. As a result, while someone
8 See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d
1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987) (grouping diverse technologies for watching
video content into the same market); cf. United States v. Syufy Enters., 712
F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659, 665 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding the district court’s decision to group various methods of viewing
film—including theatrical first- or subsequent-run, video rentals, and cable
television—into one market to be erroneous but choosing not to overturn the
ruling because of the sufficiency of alternative findings made by the district
court using a narrower market definition).
9 On use of the HMT in antitrust market delineation, see 2B AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 530a; Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J.
49, 86–90 (2010).
10 See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 86–89.
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controlling only manual drip makers would find the loss of
business from this price increase unprofitable, a merger or
cartel between manual drip makers and French press makers
would enable 3,000 of the 4,000 lost sales to be “recaptured.”
Expressed differently, while a price increase of manual drip
makers alone might not be profitable, a cartel (or monopoly)
price increase of the manual drip and French press makers
together might be profitable because when the two raise their
prices together a smaller proportion of sales will be lost. Once
we have identified the minimum grouping of products for
which a significant price increase would be profitable, we have
defined a relevant market.11
While application of this methodology is data intensive, we
can use it to determine what range of products in a
differentiated market are close enough competitors to belong
in a single relevant antitrust market. When the data are
available, this methodology is much more accurate than
simple intuitions about whether two products that serve a
common set of consumers, such as DVDs and streamed
movies, are actually in the same market.12
Manifestly, however, markets do not consist of
complements, which are goods that are either used together
(complements in use) or produced together (complements in
production).13 For example, it is one thing to put a French
press and a drip coffee maker in the same market; it is quite
another to put a French press and coffee beans into one
market. Complements generally behave in just the opposite
way from the substitutes that form a market. Although all the
products in the same market have prices that move up or
down together, the prices of complements typically move in
the opposite direction.14 This is because a buyer uses
complements together, so willingness to pay depends on the

2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 530a, e.
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust
Economics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 489, 502, 513–17 (2021).
13 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565a, d2.
14 Id. ¶ 565a.
11
12
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price of the combination.15 For example, if the price of coffee
beans rises, people will drink less coffee. That will reduce the
demand for coffee machines, decreasing their price. As a
result, the hypothetical monopolist test does not work for
complements.
Because complements are used together, some courts have
been fooled into thinking that complements occupy the same
market. For example, the Ninth Circuit once held that the fact
that a photocopier requires all of its repair parts that all
individual repair parts should be placed into an “all parts”
market rather than into their own individual markets.16 But
that states the relationship precisely backwards: The reason
we put, say, four closely spaced gasoline stations into the same
market is because the buyer does not need to go to all of them.
Rather, she needs only one, which forces the firms to compete
for her business. In order to make coffee, one needs both beans
and some kind of coffee maker, but that does not mean that
there is a single market for coffee makers and beans.
Many firms sell more than one product, and frequently the
products are non-competing. When such a firm is accused of a
market power antitrust violation, it is usually important to
assign that power to a single product—or perhaps a small
number of products where the threat of monopoly is occurring.
For example, in United States v. Microsoft Corp., the
defendant was accused of monopolizing the market for
operating systems for Intel-based computers.17 The accused
product was Windows OS only, not other software products

15 By contrast, if two goods are complements, the production output of
the two will rise or fall together. As a result, increased output of one in
response to increased demand may cause excess output of the other, and
thus falling prices. Id.
16 Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1203,
1220 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing the “commercial reality” that a firm needs access
to all of the replacement parts for a photocopier to conclude that there was
a single all parts market).
17 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).
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that the defendant also manufactured, such as Microsoft
Office.18
But suppose a firm is accused more generally of an
antitrust violation involving a large range of products, many
of which are non-competing. This issue has arisen in
numerous contexts. One is the evaluation of hospital
mergers.19 The merger concern is the hospitals’ exercise of
market power; but hospitals provide a very large range of
services, most of which do not compete with one another.20 For
example, abdominal surgery does not compete with brain
surgery, which does not compete with a blood test or an
ultrasound. Although all of these procedures are performed
within the hospital, clearly that is not sufficient to include
them in the same market. After all, Walmart sells both
toasters and chainsaws, but that hardly justifies defining a
“toaster/chainsaw” market.
Suppose, however, that some firms sell only product A,
others only product B, and others only product C. Further,
only one firm sells all three. Does this firm control a “cluster”
in which its market share is 100%? Or does the relevant
market include the other, single-product firms?21 The answer
to this question could be critical in an antitrust case involving
firms such as Facebook or Amazon, which have largely
nondominant positions in many of the individual and
noncompeting services or commodities that they offer. Yet,
both aggregate a large number of distinct services or products
together. For example, while Amazon’s individual shares in

Id. at 51–52 (concluding that the relevant market must include all
products “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,”
which limited the market to operating systems for Intel-based computers,
thus excluding the Mac OS).
19 See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 566–67 (6th
Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the FTC’s grouping of noncompeting services that
used similar facilities and assets).
20 See id. at 565–66.
21 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
18
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most products are relatively small, its aggregation accounts
for more sales than almost any firm save Walmart.22
This process of aggregating noncompeting products or
services leads to the creation of “cluster markets,” which are
markets that consist of noncompeting goods.23 It then
becomes important to ask when it is sensible to locate power
in the cluster itself rather than in the simple presence of any
particular item. Clustering is not appropriate simply because
a firm sells two or more noncompeting goods. Rather, there
must be some reason for thinking that the act of clustering
creates the power.
In general, clustering contributes to market power only
when an antitrust court is satisfied that:
(1) “many customers” need or at least “prefer the
convenience of receiving the defendant’s grouping of
products”24 rather than any single product,25 or
(2) “economies of joint provision (economies of scope)”
make it cheaper to distribute the cluster rather than each
good separately,26 and
(3) entering into competition with the cluster is difficult.27
Later, we consider the range of network effects as one
additional rationale that the courts have not yet addressed
22 See Top 100 Retailers 2021 List, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N (Sept. 27, 2021),
https://nrf.com/resources/top-retailers/top-100-retailers/top-100-retailers2021-list [https://perma.cc/39DY-6B8A] (showing Walmart as largest in
sales, with $543 billion in annual sales, and Amazon as second, with $263
billion). If the sales are limited to e-commerce, Amazon is the largest. See
Stephanie Chevalier, Leading Retail Online Companies in the U.S. 2021, by
Market
Share,
STATISTA
(Oct.
29,
2021)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/274255/market-share-of-the-leadingretailers-in-us-e-commerce/ [https://perma.cc/VN6P-5QTY].
23 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
24 Id.
25 See Ian Ayres, Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95
YALE L.J. 109, 114–15 (1985) (emphasizing role of transactional
complements).
26 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
27 Id.
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but that could be relevant to estimating the market power of
digital platforms.28
When these conditions are satisfied, clustering is a useful
tool. Further, using clustering is not simply a matter of
administrative convenience. Rather, the act of clustering can
itself create additional market power.
Of these three criteria, the first and second refer to the
nature of demand. The third refers to supply.29 A relevant
market for antitrust purposes is a grouping of sales for which
both demand substitution and supply substitution are
sufficiently low to warrant the conclusion that a firm or cartel
that controlled the sales could profitably reduce output and
raise the price above cost.30 Thus, we are trying to identify a
cluster of products that is uniquely attractive to consumers
but also difficult to create and supply. When both of these
things are true, we can infer that the firm controlling this
cluster could charge sustainable prices above the competitive
level.31
Note that the two demand-side items, criteria (1) and (2)
above, are expressed in the alternative and distinguish two
very different situations. In the first, the cluster market exists
because consumers want the cluster or perhaps some portion
of the cluster that varies from customer to customer or from
visit to visit. Facebook very likely falls into this category.32 It
offers a variety of noncompeting services, including photo
posting, video posting, messaging, bulletin boards, discussion
groups, timelines of other users, business services, a dating
service, as well as the ability to formulate and preserve a

See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
30 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1 (6th ed. 2020).
31 Cf. Emigra Grp., LLC v. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP,
612 F. Supp. 2d 330, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“If . . . buyers could and would
respond to a price increase by a full line seller by shifting all or part of their
business to partial line or single product sellers, or by making or providing
the product or service themselves, then a cluster market would not be
appropriate.”).
32 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c2.
28
29
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profile of personal data. Different subscribers use these things
in differing proportions, and some may not use certain
features at all. But the immediate and ongoing availability of
the cluster is itself valuable to customers.33 For many
customers, it is much more valuable to have all of these things
together on a common platform with a single subscription and
the ability to move around among them, than to have
individual sites for each function (i.e., one video posting site,
one site for posting photos, a third for messaging, and so on).
The second category is composed of situations where
clustering results from joint costs or economies of scope,
allowing the clustered seller to offer either lower prices or
better results than the non-clustered seller. For example, a
hospital may offer obstetrics, thoracic surgery, and radiology.
A typical patient does not visit the hospital for all of them. She
may want only one, but clustering either reduces the cost of
the individual services or permits individual services to take
advantage of common technologies that reduce costs or
improve quality.34
For example, a customer using Amazon to purchase a
toaster does not typically purchase a chainsaw as well.
Further, we can generally assume that the customer does not
prefer to purchase a toaster at Amazon simply because
Amazon also carries chainsaws. As a result, criteria (1) on the
above list does not apply. That leaves criteria (2), which
queries whether there are economies of scope that accrue to
offering multiple products in the same facility. Here, the
answer is maybe, making it a question of fact.35 We might
require expert testimony to prove it, but it is certainly
plausible that a firm can spread certain common costs over a

Id.
Cf. Sharif Pharm., Inc. v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC, 950 F.3d 911,
918 (7th Cir. 2020) (incorrectly limiting cluster market definition to
situations where “the cluster is itself an object of consumer demand,” but
then concluding that health care services could be a cluster market).
35 Cf. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 117 (D.D.C. 2016)
(recognizing the aggregation of diverse office supplies as a cluster market
but noting that this was analytically convenient because market shares for
the individual products were similar).
33
34
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larger variety of products. Further, firms with large sales
volume in aggregated but diverse products may have cost
advantages over smaller firms that sell only one product.
Some services, such as billing, order processing, and
warehousing, operate over all or at least many of the
products.36 Note that this is not the same thing as saying that
the firm is very large; rather, the act of clustering multiple
things together reduces costs. Most of these situations share
common costs, or costs that are distributed across the diverse
products. Even relatively small firms can benefit from
clustering.
That leaves the third question, which is whether a firm
currently providing a smaller range of products could readily
expand to offering a larger range of products. Once again, the
answer is maybe. The question is factual and specific to each
situation. If any store currently selling lumber could easily
add plumbing and electrical components to its inventory, then
clustering likely will not increase power.37 This particular
grouping has too high an elasticity of supply to be a relevant
market.

II. CLUSTER MARKETS IN ANTITRUST CASES
Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized
antitrust cluster markets several times, often without
expressly relying on the above three criteria. For example, in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme
Court ruled that “commercial banking”—consisting of a
cluster of various types of accounts, loans, and other financial
services—constituted a relevant market even though other
financial institutions such as savings and loan associations
provided many of these individual services.38 Either one or

See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c2.
Cf. Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369,
1374, 1376–77 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no distinct cluster market for stores
that grouped building supplies and paint where any store could readily
group them).
38 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963)
(referring to the “cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services
36
37
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both of the first two conditions stated above were apparently
satisfied. As the Court observed, consumers deposited funds
in commercial banks even though other institutions paid more
interest, and for many users there was a “settled consumer
preference” for commercial banks.39 The third condition was
also satisfied because commercial banks alone provided
checking accounts at that time, they had certain cost
advantages in other services, and entry into commercial
banking was limited by law.40
Likewise, both economies of joint provision and consumer
preference explained the cluster market found in the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Grinnell Corp., which
involved central station property protective services.41 These
services included burglar alarms, fire alarm service, and
sprinkler monitoring services.42 Ex post, a fire alarm service
is not a substitute for a burglar alarm service, and so on. Ex
ante, of course, burglars, fires, and malfunctioning sprinklers
that cause flooding all create a risk of harm, and someone may
not know in advance which harm she will suffer. The central
station reduced the cost of joint provision, in the process
advantaging a dominant firm that controlled the combination
(such as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term
‘commercial banking’”).
39 Id. at 356–57.
40 Id.; see also United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660–66
(1974) (identifying “commercial banking” as a relevant market, although
noting that future developments in regulatory policy might make it
“unrealistic” to distinguish savings banks from commercial banks); United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 359–62 (1970)
(finding a “commercial banking” market though the district court found that
the main business of the merging banks resembled that of savings and loan
associations excluded from the market).
41 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 566–67 (1966).
42 Id. at 566, 567 n.4 (1966); see also FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holdings
ASA, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27, 49 (D.D.C. 2018) (agreeing with FTC that a cluster
market existed for a variety of water treatment products and services); cf.
Premier Comp Sols. LLC v. UPMC, 377 F. Supp. 3d 506, 528–29 (W.D. Pa.
2019). In Premier Comp Sols. LLC, the court incorrectly rejected the cluster
market of cost containment services because the defendant appeared to be
the only firm that offered the cluster. This is hardly decisive and may have
shown only that the defendant was a monopolist.
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over ones who offered each service separately. Under the
hard-wire technology of the time, these services were
connected by a single phone line and monitored from a
common center, which could monitor for all of the risks.43 The
important question was whether a firm that offered all of the
services together would be in a position to charge a price
significantly above its costs. If so, the aggregation is a relevant
market.44
Often the “clustering” problem refocuses our attention on
the exact input that is being monopolized by the offeror. This
is demonstrated by the relevant market for “surgical
services.”45 While individual surgical services are not
substitutes for each other, an important source of market
power lies in the surgical facility itself.46
When these economies are less obvious, most customers
want only one service, or the cluster is readily copied, the
courts are much less likely to find a cluster market.47 For
43 On the technology, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp.
244, 249 (D.R.I. 1964), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See
also Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1379–80 (W.D. Wis.
1997) (finding, in dicta, that “physician services” was not an appropriate
cluster market because buyers do not purchase all of them together, with
court ultimately concluding that this finding did not undermine plaintiffs’
claim, for defendants had power even when the various services were
considered separately); Premier Comp Sols., LLC v. UPMC, 163 F. Supp. 3d
268, 279–80 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (denying motion to dismiss concerning cluster
market for insurance services involving workers compensation); Omni
Healthcare, Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB, 2015
WL 275806, at *12–13 (M.D. Fl. Jan. 22, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss
on claim involving an alleged cluster market of medical diagnostic services);
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 816–18 (7th Cir.
2012) (finding that bundle of hospital services could be a product market);
2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1; cf. FTC v. Advoc. Health
Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 468 (7th Cir. 2016) (involving parties agreeing
to cluster market definition in hospital merger case).
44 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 280 F. Supp.
3d 691, 702–04 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d, 937 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(inconclusive decision over the existence of a cluster market for a patent
portfolio covering a group of diverse financial services patents).
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example, one court rejected an alleged market of retail “home
centers” selling electrical, plumbing, and building supplies.48
Another court rejected a market for “one stop shopping” of a
wide variety of restaurant goods by a common supplier
because the aggregation was not obviously valuable to
customers and, in any event, suppliers of one good could
readily add the others.49 For example, a customer searching
for a commercial dish washer likely will not pay more for the
appliance simply because the company also sells commercial
refrigerators. Even if the customer wants both appliances,
there must some indication that a firm selling one could not
easily add the other to its product line.
A few courts have reached the wrong conclusion simply by
confusing substitutes and complements. For example, in
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the
Ninth Circuit found a cluster market of “all parts” for Kodak
photocopiers.50 The parts were not shown to have been
48 Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1374,
1376 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that “do-it-yourselfers” on large projects might
prefer the convenience of one-stop shopping does not suggest, for example,
“that specialty stores selling house paint are unable through price
reductions or other marketing strategies to lure significant numbers of doit-yourself builders,” especially those doing simpler projects, “into buying at
a specialty store even if they purchase all their other supplies at a home
center”).
49 Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220–21
(10th Cir. 1986) (holding that defendant’s alleged advantage in supplying
multiple products was not shown to prevent buyers switching in the event
of price increase or competing suppliers from increasing their own lines); see
also United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1416–18 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (holding that where two merging suppliers of railroad track “tampers”
claimed a broader market, including other “maintenance of way” equipment
that neither competed with tampers nor reflected similar manufacturing
technology; PBTM LLC v. Football Nw., LLC, 511 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1180–
81 (W.D. Wa. 2021) (holding that goods bearing the trademarked number
“12” after the Seattle Seahawks is not a relevant cluster market); Multiple
Energy Tech., LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-664-NR, 2021 WL
2661827, at *1, 3 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2021) (dismissing but granting leave
to amend complaint alleging a relevant market of diverse types of clothing
containing “recovery enhancing bioceramics”).
50 Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1200
(9th Cir. 1997).
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produced together, and there was not even a single
manufacturer that produced all of the parts.51 Kodak
produced about thirty percent of them, and other
manufacturers produced the rest.52 The only thing they
shared in common was that Kodak distributed them.53 The
Kodak court offered administrative convenience as the
rationale,54 although it was hardly simple administrative
convenience to order Kodak to supply numerous parts that
could readily be obtained elsewhere. That amounted to a
substantive conclusion that the antitrust laws required
sharing of inputs that rivals could readily obtain on their own.
In other cases, a simple administrative convenience
rationale may make more sense, but that leaves open the
question of whether the court is really defining a cluster
market at all. For example, in the merger case Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court grouped men’s,
women’s, and children’s shoes into the same market after
concluding that the market shares of each type were roughly
the same.55 As a result, nothing was lost by grouping them. In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court
followed the same reasoning.56 Further, for each grouping,
market shares were well above the then-existing thresholds
for merger illegality.57 Notably, however, this is not really a

Id. at 1203, 1205.
Id. at 1205–06. In addition to the thirty percent of parts that Kodak
produced for itself, an additional twenty to twenty-five percent were made
by other manufacturers but subject to “tooling clauses.” Id. at 1027. The
court did not explain the significance of this. One explanation is that they
were engineering design clauses that prohibited these manufacturers from
using the same design in a part sold to someone else.
53 See id. at 1205–06.
54 Id. at 1205.
55 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 327–28 (1962)
(“whether [men’s, women’s, and children’s shoes are] considered separately
or together, the picture . . . is the same”).
56 United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
57 Id. at 331 (noting that the post-merger bank would have “36% of the
area banks’ total assets, 36% of deposits, and 34% of net loans”); see also id.
at 359 n.36 (enumerating separate and significant market share figures for
51
52
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case for a cluster market but only for identifying multiple
different markets in which the defendant has approximately
the same share. The Court would have arrived at the same
outcome in Brown Shoe had it simply identified one market
for men’s shoes, a second market for women’s shoes, and a
third for children’s shoes.
The Kodak decision saw no alternative between clustering
all of the 5,000 Kodak parts or considering each of them
individually; but that is hardly a clear conclusion.58 As in any
antitrust case alleging an anticompetitive refusal to deal, the
plaintiff needed to allege which parts posed the threat. That
may have been true only for a few parts. For example, the
patented image loop that captured the page was technically
complex, but other parts, such as a flat glass surface, door
handles, and assembly screws, came from multiple sources.59
One important consequence of Kodak’s approach is that it
required dealing in parts that repair organizations could
readily obtain from other sources. That was tantamount to
using market definition as a tool for changing the substantive
reach of antitrust law. Under the current law of unilateral
refusal to deal, the duty is very narrow and limited to inputs
that are essential to a competitor’s survival.60 Whether that
duty should be expanded to include non-essential inputs as
well may be worth debating, but the debate should not be
foreclosed simply by defining a single “market” that includes
both essential and non-essential goods.

commercial and industrial loans, personal loans, real estate loans, lines of
credit, personal trusts, time and savings deposits, and demand deposits).
58 Cf. Godix Equip. Exp. Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1570,
1580 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d, 144 F.3d 55 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding no relevant
market for replacement parts made by Caterpillar for its own tractors when
more than ninety percent of the parts could also be made by other firms).
59 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and
Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 286–87 (noting the components of
the Kodak photocopier).
60 See 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
773b (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2015).
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III. NETWORK EFFECTS AND CLUSTER MARKETS
Large digital platforms often provide numerous
noncompeting products or services on a single website and
allow users to freely select among them. Can these be
clustered into a single relevant market for purposes of
antitrust analysis? The same criteria that delineate cluster
markets in traditional technologies also apply to digital
platforms, with one addition.
The extent to which network effects operate as a
substantial entry barrier has been widely debated.61 Many
people have suggested that networks are “winner-take-all”
markets,62 or natural monopolies. That is not true for the
majority of networks.63 Nevertheless, network effects can
sometimes operate as a significant entry barrier, although
mainly vis-à-vis new entrants attempting to enter with an
61 E.g., Yael V. Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu,
Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture
Capital, 65 J. FIN. 829, 831–32 (2010) (finding that, in venture capital
markets, “strong networks among the incumbent[] [venture capital firms]
in the target market reduce the likelihood of entry[]” but that a “[venture
capital] firm is significantly more likely to enter if it has previously
established ties to incumbents”); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 484–87
(1998) (acknowledging the viability of network theory, examining the
integration of network theory into seven fields of law, and recommending
“indicia” that “courts and legislatures may use in applying network effects
theory to legal issues”); cf. Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier,
119 Q. J. ECON. 159 (2004). For skepticism, see Gregory J. Werden, Network
Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 88–89 (2001) (noting that “[t]he mere presence of
network effects does not imply anything important about conditions of
entry”).
62 Daniel A. Hanley, A Topology of Multisided Digital Platforms, 19
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 289–91 (2020); cf. Thomas Noe & Geoffrey Parker,
Winner Take All: Competition, Strategy, and the Structure of Returns in the
Internet Economy, 14 J. ECON & MGMT. STRATEGY 141, 141–43 (2005)
(excluding companies that sell products with a positive marginal cost, such
as Amazon, and those “whose value clearly depends upon network
externalities,” like eBay).
63 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130
YALE L.J. 1952, 1969–2000 (2021).
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identical product.64 The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC)
amended antitrust complaint against Facebook acknowledges
this, alleging both that entry barriers into Facebook’s market
are high as a result of significant network effects65 and that
the biggest threat of entry is not from clones. Rather, the more
realistic entry threat is from “a differentiated product that is
able to gain scale quickly” by being distinctive.66 To the extent
that a differentiated entrant faces a different demand curve,
the usual rules governing natural monopoly markets with
declining costs do not strictly apply.
Even if the dominant incumbent’s costs are declining, a
differentiated firm can enter the market by appealing to
distinct customer preferences. The FTC’s amended complaint
alleges that Facebook “lacked the business talent” to innovate
adequately on its own, instead using the strategy of “buying
up new innovators that were succeeding where Facebook
failed.”67 More particularly, it alleged, Facebook lacked the
wherewithal to keep up with the emergence of the
smartphone, which promised greatly to increase the variety of
uses in which customers with cellular phones engaged.68
Because Facebook was unable to innovate to adjust to a
customer base increasingly dominated by smartphone users,

Id. at 1996–2000.
See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 163, 211, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No 203590 (JEB), 2022 WL 103308 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022) (mentioning “direct
network effects and high switching costs” as entry barriers) [hereinafter
Facebook Amended Compl.]; see also id. ¶ 4 (Facebook’s “personal social
networking monopoly is protected by high barriers to entry . . . because a
personal social network is more valuable to a user when more of that user’s
friends and family are already members, a new entrant faces significant
difficulties in attracting a sufficient user base to compete[.]”); id. ¶ 211
(same).
66 Id. ¶ 66.; see also id. ¶ 127 (alleging that WhatsApp’s distinctive
approach to messaging and security created “an important form of product
differentiation” that made it “an independent competitive threat[.]”); id. ¶ 5
(alleging that Facebook is protected from competitive threats “until a
disruptive or innovative technology emerges to open up new ways for users
to connect.”)
67 Id. ¶ 5.
68 Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
64
65
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it developed a strategy of acquiring other differentiated firms
more adept at taking advantage of this new technology.69
On the demand side, significant network effects can
sometimes provide an important rationale for cluster
markets. Single side, or “direct,” network effects increase a
particular platform’s value as the number of users increase,
although that fact alone does not necessarily provide a
rationale for clustering diverse and non-competing services.70
For example, a telephone network is more valuable because it
allows a person to talk to a larger number of other
participants as users increase,71 even if all they do is talk.
“Indirect” network effects can have the same effect on twosided markets, making the platform more valuable as the
number of participants on the other side increases.72 The Uber
ride hailing platform becomes more valuable as the number of
riders grows because this increase attracts more drivers.
Moreover, a greater number of drivers will attract more
riders. But these effects result without regard to the variety
of services.73
Individually, the various services that Facebook offers
consumers appear to be non-competing, much like the
individual services that a hospital provides.74 However, the
availability of multiple services simultaneously and on the
same platform is more attractive to customers to the extent
that such customers make use of different services at different
times, can access them immediately from within the platform,
and the services complement one another. The amended FTC
complaint against Facebook refers to this aggregation as a
“social graph” that maps on the way that friends and families
keep in touch with one another.75 It provides the “backbone”
to the “features” that Facebook offers76 in much the same way
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. ¶¶ 6–8, 53–61 (partially redacted, but providing further detail).
See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 421h.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Facebook Amended Compl., supra note 66, ¶¶ 166, 168.
Id. ¶ 166.
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that a hospital operating room might provide the backbone for
a wide variety of procedures that individually do not compete
with each other. Once the operating room is in place, it can be
used for a variety of services at relatively low incremental
cost.
Economies of joint provision result from common costs, or
costs that can be distributed across two or more products or
services, whether or not they are competing.77 For example, it
is very likely less costly for Uber to expand into Uber Eats food
delivery with its existing technology and network of drivers
than it would be for a new firm to start a food delivery service
on its own. For Uber and Uber Eats, most of the costs can be
shared across both services, and the two services very likely
operate over the same geographic range. To the extent the
network itself creates an entry barrier, this would provide a
rationale for grouping Uber rides and Uber Eats into a cluster
market.
When network effects are present, they create an
important variation on common costs called “scope” effects, or
the increased value that accrues as a group of goods or
services offered on the same platform becomes not only more
numerous but also more diverse.78 For example, suppose Uber
has traditionally served only passengers but now adds Uber
Eats, a food delivery service serving the same territory and
employing the same vehicles, drivers, management, and
technology. The result is that Uber’s network of users will
become larger as it expands to include people who might use
Uber Eats but did not previously use Uber as passengers. A
single network that includes 1,000 Uber ride customers and
500 Uber Eats customers will have significant cost and
network advantages over two separate networks for each of
these buyer groups.
When Uber’s participation balancing between drivers and
riders is in equilibrium, it will be able to increase platform

2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
The classic treatment is John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig,
Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268 (1981).
77
78
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size or returns only by reducing its own costs or markup.79 If
it attempts to increase its user base above equilibrium by
cutting fares, it will repel drivers. If it increases fares, it will
repel riders. This results from the interdependent demand
structure of two-sided markets. The equilibrium position
maximizes the firm’s revenue assuming that demand, cost, or
other external factors do not change.80
A promising alternative way for Uber to increase its
profitability is to expand into a new product or service that
rides on Uber’s existing investment. On the demand side,
rides and food delivery have largely independent demand:
They are usually neither substitutes nor complements. That
is, at any particular point of market engagement, most
customers want one or the other but not both, and one is not
a good substitute for the other. Thus, this differentiation
enables Uber to enlarge its customer base by adding food
delivery without sacrificing fares and repelling drivers. To the
extent that clustering ridership and food delivery increases
the user base, Uber profits. For example, if the food delivery
market is 40% of the rides market, Uber could enlarge its
passenger base from 1,000 fares to 1,400 fares without cutting
prices. On the other side of the market, the availability of
drivers would increase to the extent that more fares are
available, provided the drivers were able to transport both
passengers and food. As a result, the market grows on both
sides.
By clustering different services, other platforms such as
Amazon or Facebook do the same thing. For example,
Facebook certainly becomes more valuable as it adds
participants on all sides. It also becomes more valuable to
these participants as it increases the range of activities that
79 On participation balancing on two-sided markets, see Erik
Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713, 722–24 (2019); JeanCharles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37
RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006). See also E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of MultiSided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1642 (2010) (arguing that more
generally, factors that produce more participation on one side ordinarily
lead to less participation on the other side).
80 See Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 723 n.51.
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members can perform. These activities include the ability to
chat with friends, share photographs or videos, form or join
discussion groups dedicated to a particular subject, promote a
business, plan events, and so on. Adding additional activities
in turn attracts more users.
Many of these services, such as photo sharing, video
sharing, and messaging, are noncompeting. Some may
function as complements in use (i.e., users use them together,
such as photo posting and messaging), but others may be quite
independent of one another. To the extent the services are
offered on the same platform and share some common costs,
they are also complements in production.81 As a result,
Facebook’s user base grows larger as Facebook offers more
product diversity, which in turn attracts greater advertising
revenues.
In its amended antitrust complaint against Facebook, the
FTC alleged a relevant market of “personal social networking
services.”82 The complaint does not refer to these services as a
cluster market. Rather, it mentions the facts that the services
are collectively “built on a social graph that maps the
connections between users” and other contacts.83 The services
share “features that many users regularly employ to interact”
with others.84 These include “features that allow users to find
and connect with other users.”85 In addition, the complaint
explains why other services, including YouTube, Spotify,
On complements, see supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
Facebook Amended Compl., supra note 66, ¶ 163. The complaint
explains:
81
82

Personal social networking services are a relevant product
market. Personal social networking services consist of
online services that enable and are used by people to
maintain personal relationships and share experiences with
friends, family, and other personal connections in a shared
social space. Personal social networking services are a
unique and distinct type of online service.
Id. ¶ 163.
83 Id. ¶ 166.
84 Id. ¶ 167.
85 Id. ¶ 168.
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Netflix, and Hulu, are not in this relevant market—mainly
because they specialize in providing media for passive
consumption rather than communication purposes.86 The
complaint also alleges that LinkedIn and other professional
networking services, as opposed to social networking services,
are not in the relevant market.87
Facebook’s motion to dismiss the original complaint, which
was filed in March 2021, responded that the FTC “[h]as [n]ot
[a]lleged [a] [p]lausible [r]elevant [m]arket[,]” because it fails
to allege “a market that includes all products that consumers
consider acceptable substitutes.”88 The motion also stated
that “[t]he FTC does not allege any facts that would permit
the Court to discern which products (or even which features of
Facebook) are in the alleged market and which are not.”89
Further, “[i]t does not and cannot define the market using the
standard analysis of cross elasticity of demand, i.e., the effect
a change in price for one product would have on demand for
another.”90
In dismissing the original complaint,91 the court did not
conclude that the individual services must be substitutes for
each other. However, it agreed on nearly everything else,
citing the lack of detail about the extent to which Facebook
was interchangeable with rivals.92 Ultimately, the court found
the alleged market to be at least minimally plausible although

Id. ¶ 174.
Id. ¶ 172.
88 Memorandum in Support of Facebook, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss
FTC’s Complaint at 1, FTC v. Facebook, No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL
2643627 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of
Facebook]; cf. Expert Report of Carl Shapiro at 13, FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190
F. Supp. 3d (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-2115) (noting defendant’s objections that
the cluster market for consumable office supplies was “Not Consistent with
Market Reality”). The FTC eventually prevailed. See FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
190 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016).
89 Memorandum in Support of Facebook, supra note 88, at 2.
90 Id.
91 FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C.
June 28, 2021).
92 Id. at *12.
86
87
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“idiosyncratically drawn.”93 Further, the court found severe
deficiencies in the way it measured market share.94 The
amended complaint was much better on this score,95 and the
court sustained it.96 It also concluded that the FTC had
adequately alleged market shares upward of eighty percent.97
When an alleged relevant market consists of a single and
relatively well-defined product, things that are inside of it
should be close substitutes, which is simply another way of
saying that they have high cross-elasticity of demand among
one another. As a result, the prices of one firm’s good within a
market and another firm’s good in the same market will move
up and down together. If the market is product differentiated,
they may do this imperfectly, but they will do it nonetheless.98
Cluster markets are different, however. For example, the
group of diverse services offered by a hospital, such as
abdominal surgery, obstetrics, and anesthesiology, do not
experience mutual high cross elasticity of demand, and prices
do not necessarily move up and down together. Some of them
are “complements in use,” such as surgery and anesthesiology,
which means that patients consume them together, as they
would hot dogs and mustard. Others are “complements in
production,” such as different types of surgery performed in
the same operating room and with at least some common
costs.99 Indeed, all of them may be complements in production
to the extent that cost savings attach to performing them in a
common facility. The relevant market exists, not because
there is high cross elasticity of demand among the various

Id.
Id. at *13 (“The Court is thus unable to understand exactly what the
agency’s “60%-plus’ figure is even referring to, let alone able to infer the
underlying facts that might substantiate it.”). The court then permitted the
FTC to replead. Id. at *23.
95 See Facebook Amended Compl., supra note 66, ¶¶ 194–200.
96 FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2022 WL 103308, at *1
(D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022).
97 Id. at *6
98 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565d1.
99 On the meaning and types of complements, see 2B AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565a.
93
94
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offerings, but rather because there are significant customer
conveniences and preferences that adhere in the aggregation
or economies of joint provision, and the aggregation is difficult
to duplicate.100
Facebook’s criticism that the FTC’s original complaint
failed to allege which features are in the market and which
are not was appropriate, but in a dynamic setting such
criticism can be pushed too far. In many cluster markets, the
precise aggregation of products and services changes over
time and, in any event, is not very important. For example, a
hospital may add heart transplants or third degree burn
treatment or other critical care procedures to its capabilities,
or a central station security service may add video monitoring.
As noted above, a ride-hailing firm such as Uber may add food
delivery.101 If Philadelphia Bank102 added internet-based bill
pay, it would still be a cluster market of banking services,
albeit one that offered an additional service. The rationale for
the market definition is the clustering of services in a way that
increases consumer satisfaction or reflects economies of joint
provision. The list of individual items in this cluster can easily
vary in both directions without undermining the rationale.
The specific individual services contained in a firm’s
cluster could be relevant in a private competitor lawsuit
alleging harm that is focused on a particular product or
service. In a government suit, however, the only query is
whether the cluster as a whole is a meaningful aggregation
capable of exercising power.103
In two-sided markets, it is not uncommon that firms
exercise power on one side while they obtain their revenue on
the other side. That is true, for example, of Facebook and
Google Search.104 There, the question is whether Facebook’s
See supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
See supra text accompanying notes 73–81.
102 See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
103 This is why the causation requirement in a private government
antitrust action is much more specific and focused than in a government
enforcement action. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and
Causation, 99 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 787 (2021).
104 Id. at 806.
100
101
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market power as an offeror of social network services places it
in a position either to charge anticompetitive prices or impose
unreasonably exclusionary practices on advertisers or other
businesses with whom it deals.

IV. CLUSTER MARKETS AND DIRECT PROOF OF
POWER
Clustering is one way to approach the market power
problem in cases involving multiproduct digital platforms
such as Facebook. However, it is not necessarily the best way.
To date, clustering has been used in the case law mainly to
provide a market definition. As a result, it applies to “indirect”
proof of power.105 By contrast, “direct” proof examines
evidence indicating not that the defendant controls a given
market share, but rather that it actually has power over
price.106 For example, this could be evidence that the
defendant is able to obtain a higher price by reducing its
output and that such a price increase would be profitable.
Proof of power by reference to a share of a defined market
is usually termed “indirect” because of the number of
inferences it requires. In most cases, estimating a market
share of a relevant market does not permit us to quantify a
firm’s ability to profit by charging a supracompetitive price.
Rather, it supports a rather general inference that such power
exists, while also perhaps providing some rough ideas about
magnitude.107 Technically, market share can produce an
accurate measure of market power only if we know the market
elasticity of demand and the supply elasticity of fringe
competitors. Even then, this measure is accurate only in a
market made up of undifferentiated products.108 If we lack
See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
Id. ¶ 506c.
107 See Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 33–47 (2014).
108 Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937–39, 944, 964–65 (1981) (arguing that
technically market power depends on the elasticity of demand facing a firm,
its market share, the market elasticity of demand, and the elasticity of
supply of fringe firms).
105
106
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good information about any one of these variables, our
assessment of power will be less accurate. For example, to the
extent a defined market includes differentiated products, it
will understate power because everything inside the market
is regarded as perfectly substitutable.109 By the same token,
to the extent a defined market excludes differentiated
products that compete at all, it tends to exaggerate power.110
By contrast, “direct” proof relies on estimates of firm
elasticity of demand, evidenced mainly by a firm’s price-cost
margins or output responses to price changes.111 These
methodologies are capable of giving more accurate measures
of market power as it is best defined—the ability of a firm to
profit by raising its price above its costs.112 They are also able
to take product differentiation into account by identifying
residual demand elasticities facing individual firms.113 Under
perfect competition with undifferentiated products, a firm’s
attempt at a unilateral price increase would be completely
offset by output increases by other firms, making any price
increase unprofitable. Under differentiation, this will not
necessarily be the case, and the differences can be
estimated.114 For that reason, direct methods tend to be
preferred by economists. In many cases, such methods also
have the additional advantage of slicing through the
clustering problem by taking aggregated supply or demand as
given. These methods are more technical, however, and
virtually always require the use of an expert economist.115
In dismissing the FTC’s original complaint against
Facebook, the court observed that while the FTC had spent
considerable space in its brief arguing that direct evidence
2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 506c.
Id.
111 See id. ¶ 521.
112 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
437, 444–45 (2010).
113 Id.
114 On this point, see Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan,
Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 283, 285 (1988).
115 See Hovenkamp, supra note 12, at 513–14, 517.
109
110
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showed Facebook’s market power, the complaint was in fact
thin on that issue and lacked supporting facts.116 The FTC
added considerable detail in its amended complaint,117 even
though it was working against the fact that Facebook is
costless to users. This makes measuring demand responses to
price changes impossible. However, quality operates as a
surrogate for price; that is, a quality decrease should operate
the same as a price increase and reduce consumer demand.
Here, the FTC alleged that Facebook did not experience a
reduction in usage despite implementing quality changes that
reduced user satisfaction.118 The FTC also alleged that certain
restrictive contract practices Facebook imposed on application
developers would not have succeeded without market
power.119 That claim, if factually supportable, should succeed.
Certain types of conduct, but particularly contractual
restraints, are plausible only on the premise that the firm
imposing them has market power.120 One warning, however,
is that the conduct must be unprofitable to the firm upon
whom it is imposed or undesired by consumers. For example,
one could not infer market power from resale price
maintenance or territorial restraints imposed on dealers if the
dealers preferred it.121
In its second opinion, which sustained the FTC’s amended
complaint,122 the District Court sidestepped the issue of direct
proof entirely. Since it had already sustained the complaint on
traditional market definition grounds, it held, the court did

116 FTC v. Facebook, No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643627, at *14
(D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
117 Facebook Amended Compl., supra note 66, ¶¶ 204–10.
118 Id. ¶¶ 205–07.
119 Id. ¶¶ 209–10.
120 On inferring market power from conduct, see 2B AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 520.
121 See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
1604a (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2015); see also Facebook Amended Compl.,
supra note 66, ¶ 210 (noting Facebook’s own memoranda indicating that
Facebook had become a must have application for some app developers).
122 FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 (JEB), 2022 WL 103308 (D.D.C.
Jan. 11, 2022).
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not need to reach the issue of direct proof.123 It did suggest
that a case relying on direct proof would be “rare,” perhaps
indicating some discomfort with the approach.124 Factually
and historically, that is undoubtedly true, but the proof and
reliability case for direct proof has been consistently growing
stronger, and it has clear advantages in product differentiated
markets such as the one in the case against Facebook. The use
of such methodologies, which do not require a market
definition, have become routine in unilateral effects merger
cases—another area of the law in which the focus of inquiry is
on product differentiated markets.125 Indeed, between 1989
and 2014, the proportion of merger investigations in which the
FTC used unilateral effects theories increased from roughly
sixteen percent at the beginning of the period to seventy-six
percent at the end.126
One interesting feature of the cluster market analysis is
that the process uses many of the same tools that are used to
assess power directly. We infer the existence and strength of
complements, economies of joint provision, and the range of
network effects by examining the economics of market
demand and supply directly. As a result, a great deal of “direct
measurement” already occurs in the determination of cluster
markets. For example, products are complements when their
demand functions are interrelated in the sense that an
increase in demand for one will occasion increased demand for
the other.127
In the context of digital platforms, direct measurement is
advantageous because the data on which it relies are usually

Id. at *4.
Id.
125 On unilateral effects mergers and their assessment without the
need to define a market, see IX PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 913–14 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. 2015).
126 Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, Did the Transition to
Unilateral Effects Affect Federal Trade Commission Merger Challenges? 1–
2
(Feb.
25,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995679 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
127 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565a.
123
124
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aggregated so as to reflect the total value that customers place
on a seller’s offerings. For example, if the issue is an
advertiser’s willingness to pay for advertising on Facebook, we
would usually look at the residual elasticity of demand facing
Facebook directly, without worrying about weighting the
individual components of that demand to account for the
various services that Facebook offers (such as video posting,
message services, and the like). Likewise, in FTC v. Staples,
Inc.,128 once the plaintiff’s expert identified the wide range of
office supplies sold by Staples as a cluster market, the expert
assessed the demand for these products overall.129 Issues
relating to whether “professional” social media services, such
as LinkedIn, should be included in the same market would not
hinder our assessment, because direct measurement should
be able to determine the extent to which they compete with
one another.
In a few cases, courts have looked to both cluster market
definitions and direct measurement in order to assess power.
Typically, they regard these as alternative methodologies for
answering the same question, just as the FTC’s complaint
against Facebook alleged. In merger cases, this approach may
also reflect the fact that case law widely requires a market
definition as a matter of law, even though direct measurement
would be preferable under the circumstances. In fact, the
expert may in fact rely on direct measurement but present the
evidence as bolstering a conclusion about market definition.
130

For example, in FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA, the
FTC blocked a merger among two providers of water
treatment chemicals and related services.131 These included
various boiler water treatment and services (BWT) as well as
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016).
See Expert Report of Carl Shapiro, supra note 88, at 15–17.
130 See United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 84–85,
& 84 n.35 (D.D.C. 2011) (acknowledging this issue, then delineating a
relevant market and also directly assessing residual demand, which does
not independently require a market definition).
131 FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C.
2018).
128
129
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cooling water treatment and services (CWT).132 The court
properly rejected the objection that BWT and CWT were not
substitutes for each other.133 That would be true in the case of
traditional market definition, but not when the query is
whether a cluster of services should constitute a market.134
However, the court also relied on expert testimony to conclude
that the output responses of the two firms was sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that the merger would produce
increased prices.135
In the Staples merger case, the court defined a cluster
market by reference to both methodologies.136 The expert
concluded “that a monopoly provider of consumable office
supplies would charge significantly more to large customers
than Staples and Office Depot today charge these same
customers.”137 In order to do this, the expert did not need to
address questions like whether individual items such as
paperclips and staples were substitutes or complements.

Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 49 & n.2.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 57–59 (relying on direct measurement—here, the hypothetical
monopolist test—to conclude that BWT and CWT were within the same
market); see also FTC v. Advoc. Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 473–
75 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding cluster market for hospital services and
permitting expert to use hypothetical monopolist test to estimate power);
Omni Healthcare Inc. v. Health First, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1509-Orl-37DAB,
2016 WL 4272164 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2016) (accepting direct expert
evidence on the existence of a cluster market and power within that
market); Carl Shapiro & Howard Shelanski, Judicial Response to the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 58 REV. INDUS. ORG. 51, 63 (2021) (approving
this approach in Wilhelmsen case for products that are “sold together but
not substitutes for each other”).
136 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 121–22 (D.D.C. 2016). On
the hypothetical monopolist test in merger U.S. analysis, see DEP’T OF JUST.
AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §§ 4.1.1,
4.1.3 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines08192010 [https://perma.cc/VC8K-PHBL].
137 Staples, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 122; see also In re McWane, Inc., No.
9351, 2014 WL 556261, at *12–13 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d 814
(11th Cir. 2015) (FTC finding a cluster market of numerous noncompeting
pipe fittings, confirmed by expert’s hypothetical monopolist test).
132
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Rather, a supplier of the aggregate package could exact a
significant price increase if it was the only local offeror of that
package.138 This direct measurement approach evades the
cluster market problem altogether by simply accepting the
offered grouping as given.139
Another advantage of direct measurement is that it can
also estimate the transactional or complementarity value of
aggregating services. With its cluster of services, Facebook is
very likely more valuable to users than several discrete sites
that individually offer one service each. This increased value
from clustering will appear in any direct measure that takes
Facebook as given and considers price or quality and output
responses accordingly. For example, when an advertiser
evaluates whether to pay for a Facebook placement, its
determination of value for that placement should reflect the
size of Facebook’s existing customer basis, which in turn
reflects Facebook’s success in creating demand by clustering
diverse services.140

V. CONCLUSION, AND A WARNING ABOUT
REMEDIES
While cluster markets seem inconsistent with the general
theory of relevant markets in antitrust, they nevertheless
perform a useful function when either consumer preference or
economies of joint provision justify grouping noncompeting
products or services together. To this, network effects provide
an additional rationale, particularly when the range of
network effects increases as the variety of a firm’s offerings

See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
See id. ¶¶ 565c1 & d2; see also Ayres, supra note 25 (defining cluster
markets in terms of economies of scope and transactional
complementarities); Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market
Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 165–66 (1992) (also noting the
inconsistent rationales that courts have used for clustering). Compare
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 157–58 (2007) (arguing against overuse of clustering to
support traditional market definitions).
140 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 565c1.
138
139

278

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2022

increase. We might speak of these as economies of scope in
consumption.
At the same time, the economics of clustering also carries
a useful message about remedies. The very phenomena that
explain why we cluster diverse products or services into a
single “market” for antitrust purposes also explains why
clustering occurs in the first place. Whether because of
economics of joint provision, consumer preferences for
complementary features, or broad network effects, firms
cluster when it is valuable to consumers, producers, or both.
As a result, antitrust enforcers should be very cautious about
remedies that break apart clustered platforms. The purpose
of the antitrust laws is not to make products perform less well,
to injure consumers, or to harm labor141 or other input
suppliers who profit from high output. Remedies should be
designed to make firms perform better, not worse. This
suggests that in most instances, breakups—other than
divestiture of acquired companies—should be avoided.
Fortunately, a wide range of remedies are within the
equitable powers of the courts.142

141 On harm to labor from reduced output, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Worker Welfare and Antitrust, U. CHI. L. REV. (2022) (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4015834 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
142 For exploration of the possibilities see Hovenkamp, supra note 64,
at 2001–39.

